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We develop a search-and-matching model where the magnitude of unemployment insurance
benefits affects the likelihood that unemployed actually engage in active job search. To quan-
titively discipline this relation we use administrative data of unemployed search audits. We
use the model to quantify the effects of unemployment reforms. For small benefits’ increases,
the policymaker faces a trade-off between an uptick in the measure of unemployed actually
searching and a fall in the unemployment exit-rate conditional on searching. For larger bene-
fits’ increases, an active search margin magnifies the benefits’ disincentives, leading to a bigger
drop in the employment rate than previously thought.
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1. Introduction
We develop a general equilibrium search-and-matching model where the magnitude of unem-
ployment insurance benefits affects the likelihood that unemployed individuals actually engage
in active job search. With the aid of our quantitative model, we uncover novel implications of
the effect of unemployment insurance reforms on employment rates; our model shows that the
relation between benefit changes and employment rates could, in fact, be positive, or even more
negative than what was previously thought – as we discuss below, the exact impact on the em-
ployment rate depends on the magnitude of the reforms.
Although job search is central to models of unemployment, and typically a prerequisite for the
collection of benefits, evidence on its relation to unemployment benefits generosity is scant. As
such, to quantitively discipline the relation between unemployment insurance benefits and the
likelihood of search we use an administrative dataset featuring records from random audits veri-
fying whether benefit recipients engaged in active job search (in violation of state requirements,
a nontrivial fraction of these individuals do not actively look for a job), alongside information
about the (i) amount of collected benefits, (ii) previous wages and (iii) various demographic and
labor market variables. Our estimation approach capitalizes on the fact that in several U.S. states
the amount of unemployment benefits partially rely on a random timing criteria; as the Depart-
ment of Labor and Administration (2005) notes, “depending on the distribution of wages in the base
period, workers with the same total base period wages can have... different weekly benefit amounts.” Our
estimates suggest that more generous unemployment insurance benefits make it likelier that an
individual will undertake a job search for most deciles of the wage distribution.
To formally model the channel via which unemployment benefits affect the search likelihood
we build on the important literature that underscores the impact of liquidity constraints on the
unemployed (e.g., Chetty, 2008), as well as the influential literature highlighting the liquidity con-
straints of hand-to-mouth individuals (e.g. Jappelli (1990), Jappelli and Pistaferri (2010), Kaplan
and Violante (2014), Kaplan, Violante and Weidner (2014), Jappelli and Pistaferri (2014)). Indeed,
via the lens of a simple partial-equilibrium model of endogenous job search, we identify "mon-
etary search costs" as an important, yet overlooked, mechanism through which unemployment
benefits affect job search of hand-to-mouth individuals.1 Then, to quantitatively evaluate policy
1Examples of such costs include those for "presentation of self" (clothing and personal grooming), transportation,
home computer and internet access, resumé service or employment agency fees, and child care. In fact, the U.S. tax
code specifically permits deductions of various items related to job search, thus recognizing the importance of such
1
reforms, we develop a structural search-and-matching, heterogeneous-agent, general equilibrium
model where risk-averse unemployed individuals optimally decide whether to search for work,
a process which entails a monetary cost. We employ indirect inference methods where our novel
empirical estimates discussed above are used as identified moments the model matches.
We then use the model to evaluate the impact of reforms in the magnitude of unemployment
benefits.2 Overall, we find that "small" reforms with a limited increase in benefits (in a manner
made precise in our modelling section) result in an increase in the measure of job searchers. This
increase mitigates the negative impact of the decline in the probability of finding a job on em-
ployment rates, and in fact, depending on the exact wage mechanism we consider, can raise the
employment rate. Hence, for such small reforms there is a trade-off resulting from higher benefits.
On one hand, higher benefits raise the likelihood of search, as our empirical results indicate. On
the other hand, they have a disincentive effect as they reduce the job-finding rate conditional on
searching.
However, for larger reforms we find a reduction in the search likelihood which magnifies the
fall in employment rates. Importantly, this sign flip in the search likelihood is fully consistent
with our estimates of a positive elasticity of the likelihood of engaging in active search. In the
model, this sign flip is due to general equilibrium effects that operate through the reduction in the
job-finding probability conditional on searching, which cannot be captured by the reduced-form
estimates in our empirical analysis.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents our data, discusses the empirical approach,
and presents the empirical results regarding the relation between job search and unemployment
insurance benefits. We then rationalize these results with a simple non-parametric partial-equilibrium
model presented in Section 3. Based on the insights from this model, we build our general-
equilibrium quantitative model in Section 4. We discuss the general-equilibrium model’s parametriza-
tion in Section 5, and consider its policy implications in Section 6. Finally, Section 7 concludes the
paper. The different appendices contain various robustness checks that pertain to the empirical
and theoretical analysis.
monetary search costs. Moreover, Phillips (2014), studies a randomized experiment that provided a transportation
subsidy package to low-wage job seekers in Washington, DC, finding evidence that search costs matter to the urban
poor. Similarly, Franklin (2018) shows in a randomized trial in Ethiopia that cash constraints lead young individuals to
give up looking for jobs.
2It is important to stress that the estimated reduced-form elasticities discussed above are not “structural” parame-
ters and cannot be readily used for policy analysis. Additionally, the reduced form estimates cannot take into account
the effects of the changes in taxes required to finance the reform, which our equilibrium model does.
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2. Data and Empirical Approach
2.1. Dataset
We provide a brief discussion of the dataset here, and refer the reader to Appendix A.1 for a
detailed description. Since 1988, the U.S. Department of Labor has organized random audits of un-
employment insurance (UI) payments, investigating “the UI claimant’s. . . efforts to find suitable
work” (see Department of Labor and Administration, 2005). Known as the Benefit Accuracy Mea-
surement (BAM) program, state UI investigators, who are regular UI case file workers, examine
UI payment records and interview claimants and employers to verify all aspects of the claim that
could affect benefit eligibility. Active job search – our main outcome variable – is a determination
by the auditor that a UI recipient met state search requirements.
Our dataset contains records for 54,780 audited cases from the years 1988 through 2006.3 For
each unemployed individual we have data on: (i) the unemployment insurance benefit (UIB)
payment; (ii) wages earned in the year prior to the spell of unemployment – the base period wages
(BPW), which we measure in real terms and on a monthly basis; (iii) the highest quarter (HQ) of
income earned in the year prior to the spell of unemployment; (iv) demographic characteristics
(age, gender, and race); (v) information on the highest educational degree attained; (vi) the last
occupation and industry the individual worked in; (vii) recall status of the previous job; and (viii)
the number of weeks remaining until the UIB expire.4 As we discuss below, we focus on the states
that use the HQ system to determine UIB amounts.
Summary statistics Before discussing our empirical approach, Table 1 reports summary statis-
tics of key variables that we later use for the empirical analysis. We report the mean and standard
deviation of these variables for our entire sample (columns 1-2) and by the decile of the BPW
(columns 3-22).5 Several noteworthy patterns emerge. First, overall, a nontrivial fraction (14.6%)
of unemployed individuals in our sample does not actively look for a job, although they are re-
quired to do so by UI state laws.6 Second, the share of individuals engaged in active job search
increases by wage deciles, ranging from 79.5% at the lowest decile to 91.2% at the highest decile.
Hence, there is a substantial variation in the likelihood of search across wage deciles, which is con-
3While the BAM program continued to be run past this year we only have access to data up to that year.
4Figure A1 depicts the distribution of weeks left in our dataset showing no bunching patterns.
5Throughout our analysis the BPW deciles are constructed by state and year pairs.
6This observation is the prerequisite for the empirical analysis we carry out in this section. Had all unemployed
individuals been active searchers, there would be no variation in search behavior to be explained.
3
sistent with the view that wages are likely to capture underlying heterogeneity in the individual
returns to engage in search, an issue we discuss below.7
2.2. Empirical Model
Our estimating model is the following Probit specification:
Si,z,t = 1(α + βUIBi,z,t + γ~Xi,z,t + δz + ηt + εi,z,t ≥ 0), (1)
where Si,z,t is a dichotomous search variable {0 = Non-Searcher,1 = Searcher} for individual i,
in state z, in period t and UIBi,z,t is the level of UIB for such an individual.8 ~Xi,z,t is a vector of
covariates chosen to control, to the extent possible, for individuals’ earning potential and includes:
BPW, demographic characteristics (age, age-squared, gender, and race), education dummies, last
occupation and industry the individual worked in, recall status, and weeks remaining until UIB
expire. Moreover, since different U.S. states have different UI laws for calculating benefits, we
include throughout state fixed effects, denoted by δz and hence rely on within-state variation. We
control for time fixed effects ηt. We cluster the standard errors at the state level and deflate all
monetary variables, such as UIB and BPW, by CPI measures converting them to real values. We
further note that we keep all observations, including those for which UIB are capped at the state
maximum.
In our empirical analysis, we remain agnostic about the mechanisms of how individuals change
their search behavior in relation to changes in UIB. Rather, we focus on identifying the reduced-
form coefficient that relates plausibly exogenous variation in UIB to actual job search. In Section 4
we interpret this identified parameter through the lens of our structural model.
2.2.1. Identification
UIB depend on past wages, so simply analyzing the link between UIB and the likelihood of a job
search may fail to identify the effect of interest for two reasons. First, past wages may directly
influence the decision to look for work: due to the positive correlation between them and benefits,
one could erroneously associate the job search decision with the benefits. Second, unobserved
7An immediate implication of this pattern, as reported in Table 1 is that the within-decile variation in search behav-
ior decreases by wage deciles: the higher the wage, the lower the variation in search behavior.
8We note that in our preferred specification we use the level of UIB as the independent variable. This is consistent
with our model where the level of UIB determines the optimal search strategy. For completeness, in the Appendix, Table































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































variables correlated with past wages, which also factor into the decision about whether to search,
generate omitted variable bias because they affect benefits through the mechanism of past wages.
To address this challenge, we take advantage of two key aspects of our dataset. First, we have
administrative information on both BPW and UIB. Second, in our sample of states, UIB are not only
a function of BPW but also exhibit substantial variation even after controlling for BPW. Specifically,
our identification makes use of the fact that, in most U.S. states, UIB that individuals receive
depend on their highest quarter of earnings during the previous year, and thus on the dispersion of
earnings across quarters. As Department of Labor and Administration (2005) notes, “depending
on the distribution of wages in the base period, workers with the same total base period wages can have...
different weekly benefit amounts.” Hence, the UIB amount is a non-stochastic function of the HQ wage,
with the function itself varying across states and over time within a given state (see Appendix A.1
for the list of states with the HQ system in our sample). To the best of our knowledge, this source
of variation in the generosity of UIB conditional on BPW has not been exploited before for the
purpose of estimating the effect of UIB on the likelihood of search.9
Due to the presence of the HQ rule, UIB are not a deterministic function of BPW. Crucially, this
allows us to estimate the effect of UIB on active job search controlling for BPW. For visual exposi-
tion purposes, consider the state of Arizona which uses a replacement ratio of 0.04 of HQ earnings
to determine UIB. As is evident in Figure 1, which depicts for each individual both the replace-
ment rate (UIB to BPW) and the ratio of UIB to HQ wages (which simply recovers the UIB law
in Arizona), the replacement rate differs across individuals with the same BPW. More generally, it
is of interest to explore whether UIB exhibit variation once our covariates are conditioned on. In
Table A1 in Appendix A.1, we calculate for each subsample determined by BPW the unexplained
variation in the HQ. We note that for the deciles for which we find below a significant effect of
UIB on search (deciles 2nd-7th), there is substantial unexplained variation in HQ as measured by
the relative low values of the R2.
9Commonly used datasets to study the effects of UIB, such as the Current Population Survey, the Survey of Income
and Program Participation, and the Panel Study of Income Dynamics do not contain individuals’ qualifying income
nor reliable information on the benefit amounts they actually receive. To overcome these issues, early studies based on
those datasets rely on estimates of benefit eligibility and amounts, not on the actual amount of benefits collected (Blank
and Card, 1991; Gruber, 1997; Chetty, 2008). Our data set, therefore, offers the following unique advantages over
others. First, information on job search is not self-reported but based on the conclusion of an auditor’s independent
investigation. Second, BPW and UIB amounts alike come from administrative records.
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Figure 1: Variation in Replacement Rates
Notes: 199 observations for the state of Arizona over the years 2002 and 2003 for which UI benefits are
below the maximum weekly amount of $205. In this graphical example we do not include observations
for which the benefits are at the state’s maximum, which assure the UIHQ is exactly 0.04.
It is natural to wonder whether the variation in the HQ earnings, conditional on BPW, is plau-
sibly exogenous. We address this concern as follows. First, in our empirical analysis we condition
on a rich set of covariates; should any unobservable variable that affects the decision to look for
work have a bearing both on the temporal distribution of wages and, hence, on UIB, only because
of the variable’s influence on past wages and on the other covariates that we condition on, our
estimates will reveal the effect of UIB on search. Second, in an attempt to reduce concerns that
omitted variables such as individual skills may be biasing our results, we allow for unrestricted
heterogeneity in the effect of UIB on job search across earning levels by conducting our analysis
for each BPW decile separately. To the extent that individuals with higher skills are also the ones
with higher BPW, carrying out the analysis by subsample and further controlling for BPW in each,
increases confidence that skills are being controlled for.10 Third, placebo tests and coefficient sta-
bility analysis suggest that the temporal variability of earnings does not drive the results through
channels other than that of its impact on UIB.11
10Within each BPW decile we further control for the actual continuous value of BPW.
11We refer the reader to Appendix B where we discuss the results of a Regression Kink Design analysis.
7
2.2.2. Results
Table 2 presents the regression estimates of equation (1) with the standard errors reported in paren-
thesis. Before discussing the effects of UIB, we briefly address the effect on active job search of the
other variables. All else being equal, the likelihood of active search increases with age but at a
tapering rate, as implied by the positive coefficient estimate on the age variable and the negative
one on the age-squared variable. The coefficients on the education dummies (with high school
dropouts serving as the excluded group) are estimated to be positive, with college graduates most
likely to actively seek employment.
With respect to the effect of UIB on the likelihood of active job search, we find that for deciles
2-7 the coefficient for UIB is positive and statistically significant with p-value of 0.0%, 0.5%, 1.1%,
4.6%, 6.8%, and 3.5% across these deciles respectively.12 To provide a "monetary" quantification,
we note that the decile specific coefficients imply that an additional $100 weekly UIB would in-
crease the search likelihood on average by 4.57% percentage points.13 Similarly, this coefficient
translates to an average elasticity across deciles 2-7 of the likelihood that an individual engages in
active job search with respect to UIB of 0.126.14
Furthermore, we report in Table 3 the predicted probability of search at the mean value of
each UIB decile. The Probit regression is run on the entire sample and every other covariate is held
constant at its mean value over the entire sample rather than within BPW decile-based subsamples.
This isolates the effect of UIB across deciles due to the mean UIB value within a decile. For the
deciles we found a statistically significant effect (deciles 2-7) the estimated effect ranges from 0.826
to 0.885. Hence, in real terms, an increase of $128 in the UIB (from the second to seventh decile)
increases the search likelihood by slightly less than six percentage points.
2.2.3. Placebo Tests and Stability Analysis
To examine the potential concern that the HQ wage captures unobservables that directly affect
both search and UIB, over and beyond the BPW that we condition on, we proceed by considering
a placebo test and a coefficient stability analysis.
12For the entire sample when not conditioning on the BPW decile we find the coefficient on UIB to equal 2.106,
estimated with a p-value of 6.5%.
13This is the average of the percentage points increase in the search likelihood across deciles 2-7 due to an increase
of $100; 3.53%, 3.74%, 4.80%, 4.62%, 4.14%, 6.58% respectively.




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3: Predicted Search Probabilities
Decile 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th
Mean UIB 171.5 199.9 226.1 251.0 276.4 298.2
Predicted Search Probability 0.826 0.841 0.854 0.865 0.876 0.885
Notes: The table reports the predicted search probabilities for deciles 2 through 7 as implied
by the Probit estimated coefficient. These predicted search probabilities are calculated with all
covariates, but the UIB, being held at their unconditional sample means, while the UIB is set
at its decile-specific mean.
Placebo tests We estimate the same Probit regression as described above solely for the subsample
of individuals whose UIB equal the maximum allowed by the law in the state/year of their audit.
We then include the HQ wage in Equation (1), keeping all the other covariates, except for the UIB.
Hence, this subsample consists of individuals who have the same UIB (since they are up against
their state’s UIB maximum) but who differ in their HQ earnings.
The logic of this approach is as follows. If the HQ wage solely affects the likelihood of search
via its effect on UIB, then once UIB is fixed the HQ coefficient should be statistically insignifi-
cant, consistent with our identification assumptions above. Such a result would be supporting the
view that HQ variation does not capture any unobservable variable that affects job search through
channels other than UIB. Table 4 reports the estimates for the coefficient of the HQ variable for
the subsample for which we found a positive effect on active search (deciles 2-7 in Table 4). As
the table suggest, we fail to reject that HQ has zero impact on search for five out of the six rele-
vant deciles. Overall, we view these placebo results as supporting our empirical strategy as they
suggest that variation in HQ are likely to affect the probability of search only through its effect on
UIB.
Table 4: Results from Placebo Test
Decile 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th
HQ Wage 0.563 -0.688 0.988∗∗ 0.147 0.343 -0.011
( 1.831) (0.587) (.408) (0.253) (0.323) (0.208)
Observations 111 402 657 1039 1636 2391
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Stability analysis To assess the robustness of our main finding of a positive effect of UIB on
search, we run several Probit regressions where we include an increasingly large set of covariates
(eventually arriving to our preferred specification). The results are in Table 5, where we report the
estimated coefficient on UIB across deciles (the columns of the table) and specifications (the rows
of the table). In the first row of the table we provide baseline Probit regression results where we
condition only on state and time fixed effects. We then add BPW to the covariates in the Probit
regression. We view BPW as crucial to capture the effect of possible unobserved individual skills
on both search and UIB. Comparing row one and row two in Table 5, we see that including BPW
indeed can have a non-negligible impact on either the UIB coefficient estimate or its significance
for several deciles. In each of rows (3)-(6), we add an additional demographic variable (respec-
tively: age and age squared; gender; education dummies; and race dummies) and note that the
UIB coefficient estimate (within decile) remains fairly stable throughout the incremental inclusion
of these covariates. Rows (7), (8), and (9) are particularly interesting in that they address specific
threats to validity of our analysis. In row (7) we include dummy variables for the occupation
and industry that an individual is in. Doing so addresses the concern that individuals in specific
industries and occupations may face higher variability in their HQ (e.g., seasonal workers), and
also differ in their unobservable characteristics from individuals in other occupations or indus-
tries in a way that might be driving our main result. However, the coefficient estimates reported
in row (7) remain positive and statistically significant (for deciles 2-7), although their magnitude
is slightly reduced. In row (8) we include the number of weeks of unemployment benefits left.
Doing so could accounts for potentially different channels. For example, individuals with less
weeks of benefits left may have a higher incentive to search, as they will run out of wage replace-
ment sooner. In contrast they might get discouraged and stop searching altogether. Moreover,
such individuals also face a lower probability of being audited, because audits are random and
occur each week, so by having less weeks left they are subject to a lower auditing probability, and
hence may have a lower incentive to search. Regardless of which of these effects prevail, the UIB
coefficient estimates in row (8) are quite similar to the ones in rows (2)-(7). Finally, in row (9) we
include recall status. Doing so addresses the concern that people who may be recalled to their
former jobs may systematically differ from those who do not both in their unobservables, and in
the variability of their HQ. However, the coefficient estimates in row (9) are again similar (within










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The empirical results presented in this section cannot identify the specific economic mechanism
determining the positive effect of UIB on search. Yet, they are consistent, as we show below in
our theoretical model, with the idea that risk-averse individuals face monetary fixed costs of job
search. Higher benefits help pay for such fixed costs, which facilitates active search.
The findings presented in Table 3 further support the notion that a positive effect of benefits
on job search might stem from liquidity constraints: by the time these unemployed individuals
are out of work, their previous earnings are gone and irrelevant, so that most of their economic
decisions, including whether to search for a job, rely on the extent of contemporaneous earnings,
i.e., unemployment benefits.
Moreover, we note that while there is limited direct evidence on the exact monetary magnitudes
of search costs, the U.S. tax code specifically allows for various items related to job search to be
deducted, suggesting that policy makers have recognized the presence of these costs. Overall,
these results are consistent with the literature highlighting the role of liquidity constraints for the
unemployed (e.g., Chetty, 2008) as well as the important literature that highlights the importance
of such liquidity constraints for hand-to-mouth individuals and shows that such hand-to-mouth
individuals are a sizable fraction of consumers in the economy (e.g., Jappelli, 1990; Jappelli and
Pistaferri, 2010; Kaplan and Violante, 2014; Kaplan, Violante and Weidner, 2014; Jappelli and Pista-
ferri, 2014).15
3. A Partial-Equilibrium Model of Costly Job Search
What are the mechanisms that rationalize our empirical findings? To address this question, we
develop a simple yet general non-parametric model that encompasses a few possible channels
through which UI affects the likelihood of search. Our objective is to determine under which
conditions and for which type of costs (monetary or other utility non-monetary costs) increase in
15We note that an alternative, complementary hypothesis is one in which unemployed individuals recognize the
possibility of being audited. In that case, if the audit is random, then the higher the benefits, the higher the cost of
being detected not exerting search effort, and thus the higher the incentives to engage in search. While we do not
have direct evidence on this mechanism, we note that the coefficient stability analysis presented in Table 5 provides
suggestive evidence against it. Notably, the estimate of the coefficient on UI benefits remains virtually unchanged
when we include along the covariates the number of weeks lefts until benefit expiration. Weeks left until benefit
expiration can be thought of as a proxy for detection probabilities: the higher the number of weeks left, the higher the
unconditional probability an unemployed individual to be audited. While not definitive, our stability analysis casts
doubts on the relevance of the detection probability hypothesis.
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benefits yields a higher likelihood of search. Based on the insights from this model, we develop a
general-equilibrium model in the next section.
The model’s main features are: (i) risk-averse individuals; (ii) the presence of search frictions
that prevent the instantaneous matching of job seekers with available jobs; and (iii) two potential
types of costly job search. The first cost is a "monetary cost," i.e., after individuals engage in a job
search their consumption declines.16 Job search is painful for risk-averse individuals because they
incur a cost when consumption is already low due to job loss. The second cost is the "utility cost" of
search, which lowers instantaneous utility but does not entail a consumption loss. It is important
to note that consistent with our Probit analysis, the model renders predictions on the relation
between benefits and a dichotomous variable indicating whether an individual is a searcher or
not, akin to a standard binary response model.
Environment and search decision We analyze the problem of an individual facing the decision
of whether to look for work. This involves specifying preferences and budget constraints, with the
production side of the economy and wage determination left unspecified. In this sense, we focus
on a decision theory problem in a partial-equilibrium setting, abstracting from the equilibrium
feedback effects of UIB on wages and job-finding probabilities.
In the model, an individual can be in three labor-market states: (i) employed at a wage, w, and
consuming c = w; (ii) unemployed, searching and paying the fixed cost s ≥ 0, collecting benefits,
b, and consuming c = b− s; (iii) unemployed, not searching, collecting benefits, and consuming
c = b.17 Note that by reducing consumption, s captures a monetary cost of searching.18
The individual’s choice between searching and not-searching is described by
V(b) = max{Vu(b),Vn(b)} , (2)
16Mazur (2016) adopts a similar assumption in the context of a McCall search model. He shows that monetary search
costs yield the well-documented spike in search effort at the time of benefit exhaustion.
17In fact, individuals can be in two other labor-market states that we do not model: either searching or not-searching
without collecting benefits (because, though eligible, they do not apply for them). While empirically relevant, these
individuals, unfortunately, are not part of our dataset. More substantively, modeling the UI application margin could
be important for quantifying the effects of changes in benefit generosity. For instance, more generous benefits could in
principle lead more people to apply for them. Given this mechanism, the question then becomes what those individuals
do conditional on applying for and collecting benefits. The model we set up here is tailored to answer this latter
question.
18Given the partial-equilibrium nature of this setting, we can normalize the wage to one, so that b can be interpreted
as benefits or as a replacement rate.
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where Vu(b) and Vn(b) are the values of searching and not-searching respectively, given by
Vu(b) = u(b− s)−Φ(s) + β
[
pS(b)Ve(b′) + (1− pS(b))V(b′)
]
, (3)
Vn(b) = u(b) + β
[
pN(b)Ve(b′) + (1− pN(b))V(b′)
]
. (4)
The utility function u(·) is strictly increasing, concave, and twice continuously differentiable. Φ(s)
captures the utility loss from "other" non-monetary search costs with Φ′(s)≥ 0 and Φ(0) = 0. pS(b)
denotes the probability of finding a job conditional on searching and Ve(b) is the value of working,
which we leave unspecified here.19 Also, henceforth, we assume that Ve(b) > V(b), for all b, so
that individuals always prefer working to either searching or not-searching.
The individual’s decision is to search if and only if Vu(b) > Vn(b). The optimal search decision
follows a reservation rule: for a given UIB level b, there is a unique cutoff on the fixed search cost,
s∗, such that if s≥ s∗ the individual does not search, and if s < s∗ the individual searches. Formally,





= u(b)− u(b− s∗) + Φ(s∗), (5)
such that the net benefit from searching, on the left-hand side, equals the net utility cost from
searching on the right-hand side.20 All else being equal, the higher the net benefit from working,
Ve(b′) − V(b′), the greater the value of the search cost s∗ that makes an individual indifferent
between searching and not-searching. By contrast, an individual with a higher disutility of search
has a lower search cutoff and so is less likely to search.
Role of monetary search costs Let G(b,b′) indicate the left-hand side of (5), such that we can
rewrite the indifference condition in more compact form as
G(b,b′) = u(b)− u(b− s∗) + Φ(s∗). (6)
19Our notation makes explicit that pS(b) and Ve(b) may depend on b. This is the case in the standard search-and-
matching model, where higher b leads to higher wages that in turn depress firms’ vacancy postings and the probability
of finding a job. In this model, the dependence of Ve(b) on b derives from the feature that wages are determined via
Nash bargaining, in which case the higher b, the greater the opportunity cost of accepting a job, the higher the wage.
20The left-hand side of (5) is independent of the search cost s, while the right-hand side is monotonically increasing
in s. Standard arguments imply that if a solution to equation (5) exists, it is unique.
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We assume that the UIB next period can be modelled as b′ = λb + (1− λ)b, where b is a long-
run level of b and λ ∈ [0,1] is a parameter governing the persistence of changes in current UIB.
Specifically, (i) if λ = 0, b′ = b, such that any change in b represents a permanent change in UIB; (ii)
if λ = 1, b′ = b, such that a change in b is temporary, lasting for only one period; (iii) if 0 < λ < 1, a
change in b is persistent, lasting a few periods.




G′(b,b′) + u′(b− s∗)− u′(b)
u′(b− s∗) + Φ′(s∗) Q 0, (7)
where












The sign of the comparative statics depends on the relative strength of two forces: the change
in the net benefit from searching, G′(b,b′), versus the change in the net utility cost from searching,
u′(b− s∗)− u′(b).21
Consider first the case in which G′(b,b′) = 0. Unambiguously, ∂s∗/∂b ≥ 0. That is, higher UIB
raise the search cutoff s∗, implying a higher likelihood of job search.22 A necessary condition for
this result is the presence of a monetary search cost. We refer to this effect as the consumption or
"liquidity channel" of UIB. Absent a monetary cost of search, and in the presence of a time cost of
search only, expression (7) implies that ∂s∗/∂b = 0. In this case, there is no effect of b on the search
cutoff s∗, so no effect on the search likelihood. Thus, there must be a "consumption/liquidity" cost
of search for the model to square with the empirical finding that the search likelihood increases
with UIB generosity.
The second case is one where G′(b,b′)< 0. Here the theory predicts an ambiguous effect of b on
s∗ as what matters is the relative strength of two competing forces. On the one hand, higher UIB
reduce the net benefit from searching. On the other hand, the same UIB increase reduces the utility
cost of job search. Which of the two effects dominates depends on a number of factors, including
parameter values describing preferences and technology, as well as the market structure, e.g., the
21We do not consider the case G(b,b′) > 0 as it holds under arguably implausible conditions. Specifically, in this
scenario one can show that, everything else equal, the value of working becomes, vis-à-vis the value of not-working,
more attractive the higher UIB are.
22This result comes from the concavity of the utility function: u′(x) ≥ u′(y) if x ≤ y.
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extent of frictions and wage bargaining protocol.
Yet, for our purposes, in this case, if, as in our empirical results, higher UIB raise the job search
likelihood, ∂s∗/∂b > 0, then, again, as in first case above, the cost must be monetary. To see this
simply note that, absent a monetary cost, the sign of ∂s∗/∂b would be negative since G′(b,b′) < 0
and the term u′(b− s∗)− u′(b) would equal zero. So in this case as well, a necessary condition to
reconcile the theory with our empirical findings is the presence of a monetary cost.
4. A General-Equilibrium Model
Based on the insights from the partial-equilibrium model in the previous section, we proceed
by presenting a parametric quantitative general-equilibrium (GE) model that we later use as a
laboratory to examine the impact of different UI policy reforms. The model’s main features are: (i)
search frictions that give rise to unemployment as in the Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides (DMP)
search-and-matching model; (ii) a notion of free-entry equilibrium in which the ratio of posted
vacancies to the mass of searchers determines the tightness of the market and thus the probability
of finding a job conditional on searching; (iii) a search decision in which risk-averse individuals
face a “monetary cost” for job searches and choose whether to look for work.23
The key advantage of the GE structure is that it enables us to gauge the equilibrium feedback
effects of UIB reforms on the search likelihood, market tightness, and job-finding probabilities.
These implications cannot be addressed in the context of the non-parametric model presented
above, let alone our empirical estimates. Importantly, we make the government budget constraint
(that it holds for each reform) a key feature of the GE nature of the model. For example, a rise in
UIB that requires additional tax revenues may be financed by an increase in labor tax rates, which
is likely, in itself, to have important equilibrium effects on search decisions, wages, and so on.
The key tradeoff we are interested in analyzing is as follows. In the model, as in our empirical
results, increased UIB would, ceteris paribus, push individuals to search for work. However,
consistent with a vast literature, higher benefits could lead to a higher equilibrium wage, which
in turn depresses vacancy posting.24 The overall effect on the employment rate is, in principle,
ambiguous given the interaction of these two opposing forces: on the one hand, the liquidity effect
23We emphasize the importance of considering risk-averse agents because, without this assumption (i.e., under
linear utility), there is no conceptual difference between the monetary cost of search and other dis-utilities associated
with costly search; i.e., subtracting a consumption cost from a linear utility or a time cost would be equivalent. Thus,
consistent with our interpretation of the search cost being monetary, we proceed with the assumption that the utility
function exhibits risk aversion.
24The strength of these equilibrium effects critically depends on the details of the wage setting mechanism.
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on search tends to expand the pool of individuals looking for work; on the other, the disincentive
effect on labor demand reduces the speed at which job searchers find jobs. We use the model to
quantify these mechanisms and evaluate their relevance for UI policy.
4.1. Environment
Before presenting the setup of the model in more detail, it is worth emphasizing that the model
represents a minimal perturbation of the prototype search-and-matching DMP model. This greatly
simplifies comparison with existing work and allows for a simple analysis of the impact of costly
job search. However, this simplicity comes at the cost of descriptive realism, as many aspects that
are absent from the benchmark DMP model (such as accumulation of assets) are left out of the
analysis.
Preferences Time is discrete and continues forever, indexed by t = 0,1, . . . ,∞. The economy
is inhabited by a unit mass of infinitely-lived, risk-averse individuals whose preferences over
consumption c≥ 0 are described by the CRRA utility function u(c) = c1−γ/ (1− γ), where γ is the
coefficient of relative risk aversion. They discount future values with the discount factor β ∈ (0,1),






Budget constraints First, if the individual works at the wage wt, then her consumption is given
by ct = (1− τ)wt , where τ ∈ [0,1] denotes a tax rate on labor income. Second, consumption is
given by ct = bwt − s if the individual is unemployed, collecting benefits bwt, given a replacement
rate b, and engaging in actual job search, in which case she pays the search cost s. Finally, if the
individual is unemployed, collecting benefits, but not searching, then her consumption is given
by ct = bwt. These last two categories, (i) unemployed collecting benefits and engaged in search,
and (ii) unemployed collecting benefits and not-searching, represent the universe in our empirical
analysis.
Search costs Individuals differ in terms of their cost of searching. Specifically, the monetary
cost of search s ≥ 0 is independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) across individuals. For
simplicity’s sake we assume that, once the individual gets her initial draw, the value of s stays the
same forever. As discussed above, such cross-sectional variation in s captures several potential
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sources of unobserved heterogeneity that we leave unspecified here, including, but not limited to,
child care costs, commuting and clothing expenses, employment agency fees, and so on.
Replacement rates We assume that individuals differ in terms of their replacement rates, b ∈
[bmin,bmax], defined as the ratio of UIB to wages. There are three reasons for heterogeneity in
replacement rates.
First, such heterogeneity in b captures the large dispersion in replacement rates we documented
from our administrative data even conditional on last period wages. Indeed, it is this variation in
the data we leverage to identify the marginal effect and so the elasticity of the likelihood of active
search with respect to UIB.
Second, as we show below, the model implies that the magnitude and the sign of the effect of
changes in UIB on active search vary across the distribution of replacement rates. Hence, based
on theoretical grounds, the underlying heterogeneity in replacement rates likely has important
implications for the aggregate as well as the distributional consequences of UIB policy reforms.
Third, modelling heterogeneity in replacement rates, and thereby UIB, allows us to discipline
the model by reproducing the predicted search probabilities estimated from our data, as reported
in Table 3, without relying on policy counterfactuals. That is, as we discuss below in the calibration
section, we use the mapping between UIB and search probabilities as a way to calibrate some of
the key parameters in the model.
Market structure As is common in the DMP literature we assume that production requires a
match between one worker and one firm. After a match ("job") is created, output is produced with
a linear production function in which labor is the only input.
We assume for simplicity’s sake that labor markets are segmented by replacement rates b. Firms
post vacancies in the submarket with the highest expected payoff, knowing with certainty the
value of the replacement rate b that the unemployed carry in that submarket.25 The mass of firms
in each submarket is determined in free-entry equilibrium, independent of other submarkets.26
25Consistent with the repeated cross-sectional nature of our dataset, we assume that an individual UIB is fixed. In
unreported results we extended the model to have a stochastic b, which significantly complicates the analysis without
altering in any significant way the results.
26Market segmentation provides analytical tractability. To grasp this, consider another market structure in which
markets are not segmented so that individuals with different replacement rates all search in the same market. In such an
environment, with Nash bargaining, vacancy-posting firms would need to keep track of the distribution of unemployed
workers across replacement rates. In a free-entry equilibrium, job-finding probabilities would become a function of the
distribution of replacement rates, an infinitely dimensional object that cannot be characterized analytically.
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In each submarket b, matching is subject to a search friction. The ratio of vacancies to searchers
θ(b) denotes tightness of submarket b. We emphasize that θ(b) is an equilibrium object, and that
as such it is taken parametrically by the individuals. Also, we denote the probability that an
individual meets a vacancy by p(θ(b)), where p : R+→[0,1] is a strictly increasing function with
p(0) = 0. And the rate at which a vacancy meets a searcher by q(θ(b)) = p(θ(b))/θ(b).27
Government A government runs a balanced budget on a period-by-period basis. To this end,
the labor tax rate τ, which individuals take as given, is the endogenous instrument we adjust to
guarantee that total labor taxes equal total benefits across all markets at all times.
4.2. Individual’s Problem
In each submarket b, individuals can be in three different labor-market states: (i) employed (e), (ii)
unemployed and searching (u), and (iii) unemployed and not-searching (n).
Denote the value of being employed in submarket b by Ve(b). Similarly, the value of being
unemployed and searching is denoted by Vu(b), while the value of being unemployed and not-
searching in submarket b is denoted by Vn(b). Formally,
Ve(b) = u(ce) + β [δmax{Vu(b),Vn(b)}+ (1− δ)Ve(b)] , (10)
where ce = (1− τ)w(b) is consumption if employed and w(b) is the wage whose determination we
describe below. The parameter δ ∈ [0,1] is an exogenous and constant job destruction rate, which
is the same in all submarkets. Upon separation (occurring with probability δ), the unemployed
individual chooses between searching and not-searching. The two value functions associated with
being unemployed are given by
Vu(b) = u(cu) + β{p(θ(b))Ve(b) + [1− p(θ(b))]max{Vu(b),Vn(b)}} , (11)
Vn(b) = u(cn) + βVn(b), (12)
where cu = bw(b) − s and cn = bw(b) if searching and not-searching, respectively. Given that
we limit our analysis to comparisons across steady states (excluding transitional dynamics across
27We note that the way we specified the market structure is such that the search cost is not contractible and thus is not
part of the bargaining problem. This is done for simplicity of the presentation as the key advantage of this assumption
is that the resulting wage does not depend on s, so that individuals with the same replacement rate b, but different
values of the search cost, s, have the same wage. In Appendix E we present an extension of the model laid out here
where the search cost is formally part of the bargaining problem.
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policy regimes), if an unemployed individual engages in search she will continue doing so. Since
finding a job is only possible when searching, for an employed individual max{Vu(b),Vn(b)} =
Vu(b), implying that we can rewrite equation (10) as
Ve(b) = u(ce) + β [δVu(b) + (1− δ)Ve(b)] . (13)
4.3. Firm’s Problem
Vacancies can either be filled, which creates a job, or unfilled. The value of a job in submarket b is
J(b) = ε− w(b) + β [δV + (1− δ)J(b)] , (14)
where ε is the output of a match that is the same in all submarkets and V is the value of posting a
vacancy. In an equilibrium with free entry, the value of an unfilled vacancy is zero at all times and




where k ≥ 0 is the unit cost of posting and maintaining a vacancy.
4.4. Wage Setting
We consider three alternative wage setting mechanisms which differ in terms of wage flexibility:
(i) the Nash-bargaining protocol, arguably the benchmark of "flexible wages" in the literature;
(ii) "sticky wages," which involves fixing the wage in each submarket at a specific value in the
bargaining set, and thus equilibrium forces are absent since wages and the probability of finding
a job conditional on searching are invariant to changes in the UIB, and (iii) "semi-flexible wages"
which are a hybrid of these two bounds for the degree of wage rigidity and the effects of changes
in UIB policy.
Nash-bargaining wages When a searcher and a firm meet, they enter bilateral Nash-bargaining.







where ρ captures the individuals’ bargaining weight and Ṽu(b) represents the outside option of
the unemployed individual when excluding the search cost, i.e.
Ṽu(b) = u(c̃u) + β
{
p(θ(b))Ve(b) + [1− p(θ(b))] Ṽu(b)
}
, (17)
where c̃u = bw(b). The solution to the Nash-bargaining problem yields a modified sharing rule
that accounts for the curvature of the utility function and the flat-rate tax on labor income,





Under Nash bargaining, the disincentive effect of UIB on the job-finding probability arises from
the bargaining problem: the higher the replacement rate, the higher the bargained wage, and the
lower the job-finding rate conditional on searching.
Sticky wages In a model with search frictions like ours, the wage is indeterminate.28 Based
on this insight, Hall (2005) introduces wage stickiness into an otherwise standard search-and-
matching model of unemployment.29
Semi-flexible wages The empirical literature has not converged on a specific magnitude of the
effects of UIB reform on job-finding rates. By considering these two wage-setting mechanisms, we
let the model encompass different "bounds" on how UIB reform affects wages and, in turn, job-
finding rates.30 Naturally, the model can be calibrated to target a specific elasticity of a UIB reform
on job-finding rates with usual modelling approaches in the literature (e.g., Yedid-Levi, 2016).31
28In each submarket, there is a bargaining set with a continuum of wages compatible with equilibrium: W(b) =
[w(b),w(b)], where the lower bound of the set is defined as w(b) = Ve(b)−Vu(b) and the upper bound as w(b) = J(b).
Nash-bargaining selects one wage in that set. Where exactly the Nash-bargaining wage locates in that set depends on
the value of the worker’s bargaining weight ρ.
29When changes in the environment shift the boundaries of the bargaining set, the wage remains constant, provided
it stays inside the bargaining set. Such wage rigidity satisfies the criterion that no bilateral gains from trade are foregone,
so that it is immune to Barro’s critique of sticky-wage models (Barro, 1977). The decentralization of the equilibrium
with sticky wages takes two steps. First, we solve for the equilibrium of the model with Nash bargaining. Second, we
use wNash(b) implied by (16) as the fixed wage of the sticky-wage economy per each b even after UIB policy changes.
30We note that one possible interpretation of these bounds is that the sticky wage version of the model, in which
job-finding rates do not react to benefit changes, is a better approximation of the short-run response, while the "flexible
Nash-bargaining" solution better approximates the long-run response to the policy reform.
31In this modification we introduce an additional parameter that links the bargaining power of the worker to labor
market tightness, in a way that tames the response of wages to changes in UIB. Formally, the bargaining power ρ is now
expressed as ρ (θ) = ρ0/
[
ρ0 + (1− ρ0) (θ0/θ)ζ
]
, where ρ0 and θ0 refer to the bargaining weight and tightness ratio in
the benchmark model, respectively. Note that when ζ = 0 the model nests the benchmark Nash bargaining case with
constant bargaining weight.
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For exposition purposes we pick the model to match the elasticity in Chetty (2008) for which the
results lie between the two other wage settings.
4.5. Equilibrium
As in the standard DMP model, the equilibrium of our model economy remains block-recursive.
That is, we can solve for the wages and tightness ratios independently of the stocks of employ-
ment, unemployment, and the mass of searchers. Equipped with wages and tightness ratios, we
can then calculate search cutoffs s∗(b) and thus the mass of searchers G(s∗(b)) in each submarket.
Market tightness and wages In each submarket, the free-entry condition (15) determines the





1− β (1− δ) . (19)





(1− ρ) [u (ce)− u (c̃u)]
1− β [1− δ− p(θ(b))] , (20)
where ce = (1− τ)w(b), c̃u = bw(b), and τ is the tax rate that balances the government budget.
Search cutoff In each submarket b, the search decision satisfies a reservation policy rule such
that if Vu > Vn the individual searches; otherwise, if Vu ≤Vn, she does not search. The indifference
condition Vu = Vn implies a cutoff value s∗, such that if s < s∗ the individual searches, whereas if
s ≥ s∗ the individual does not search.
Formally, in a steady state (with respect to tax and UIB policy), the search cutoff can be shown
to be implicitly determined by
(1− β(1− δ))u(cu) + βp(θ(b))u(ce)
1− β(1− δ) + βp(θ(b)) = u(cn). (21)
The right-hand side of equation (21) is invariant to the search cost. For a given tightness ratio
θ(b), the left-hand side is instead monotonically decreasing in s through the term u(cu), where
cu = bw(b)− s. Thus, if an intersection exists, standard argument implies that the cutoff value is
unique. In addition, the mapping s∗(b) between the search cutoff and the replacement rate b is
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invertible: the higher b is, the higher the cutoff s∗ that makes the individual indifferent between
searching and not-searching is. Since the measure of searchers is the cumulative density function
at s∗, it follows that, everything else equal, the measure of searchers increases with b.
5. Bringing the General-Equilibrium Model to the Data
In this section we specify functional forms and parameter values. The baseline parameterization
consists of two steps. First, to ease comparison with previous work, we calibrate a subset of pa-
rameters based on common values in the literature. Second, we estimate the remaining parameters
to match a select number of empirical targets.
5.1. Parametrization
Preferences There are two parameters describing preferences: β and γ. We calibrate our monthly
model to accord with a 4% annual interest rate, implying that the time discount factor β is set
equal to 0.997. The coefficient of risk aversion γ is set equal to 2, which implies an elasticity of
intertemporal substitution of 0.5, a value which is commonly used in the literature.
Replacement rates Let~b denote the vector of replacement rates across the different submarkets.
To calibrate this vector we create an evenly spaced grid, ranging from the lowest value bmin = 0.4
to the highest value bmax = 0.6. These lower and upper bounds correspond to the values of the
inter-quartile range of the replacement rates distribution we recover from our data.
Labor market In each submarket, a matching technology yields the number of matches m as a
function of the mass of searchers u ≥ 0 and posted vacancies v ≥ 0. Based on Den Haan, Ramey
and Watson (2000), we assume that the flow of successful matches within a period is given by the





where χ ≥ 0 is a parameter to be calibrated. The appealing feature of this matching function
relative to the Cobb-Douglas specification is that it guarantees that matching probabilities are
between zero and one for all values of u and v. Specifically, the job-finding probability p(θ) and
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the job-filling probability q(θ) are, respectively,
p(θ) = (1 + θ−χ)−1/χ, (23)
q(θ) = (1 + θχ)−1/χ. (24)
Next, we turn to the parameters related to frictions in the labor market, (δ,k,χ). We set the job-
separation rate δ equal to 2%. Then, we jointly calibrate the unit vacancy cost, k, and the matching
technology parameter, χ such that: (i) tightness ratios are equal to one in the steady state;32 and
(ii) job-finding probabilities equal 0.3. This strategy yields k = 1.2 and χ = 0.5973.
Bargaining weights We consider two distinct calibrations of the bargaining weights. In the first
calibration, we set the bargaining weight’s value to be identical across all submarkets. For well-
known reasons, such a calibration implies that the wage varies across different submarkets. Such
a variation introduces another channel through which individuals with higher UIB are likelier to
seek employment on top of the liquidity value of UIB: namely, that the incentives to search are
greater due to the higher return from a higher wage.
However, there are two main shortcoming with this approach. First, it is not obvious whether
such a channel is operative in our data (we do not observe the wages of the individuals upon
rehiring). Second, and perhaps more importantly, recall that our empirical results suggested that
there is no associated probability increase in active search occurring due to individuals having
had higher past wages. In contrast, our empirical results suggest that the variation in predicted
search probabilities arises from variation in UIB. We thus aim to isolate the effects of UIB.
Hence, here, we present a version of the model where the bargaining weights vary across the
different submarkets, such that the resulting bargained wage is identical across all submarkets.
This has the advantage of isolating the role of the UIB as the sole reason for variation in search
probabilities. Moreover, it highlights the role of UIB as a liquidity source.33 The calibrated values
of the bargaining weights lie in the interval [0.3011,0.5], ranging from a value of ρ = 0.3011 for
the submarket with the highest replacement rate to ρ = 0.5 for the submarket with the lowest
replacement rate. These bargaining weights assure that the wage is the same across submarkets
that differ in replacement rates.
32This is a normalization without loss of generality.
33In Appendix D, we consider results from a version of the model where all markets have the same bargaining
weight, such that wages differ across submarkets. Importantly, none of the results presented in the body of the paper
changes.
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Search costs We are left to parametrize the distribution of search costs, which we assume are
drawn from a Log-Normal distribution with mean µs and variance σ2s . To pin down these two
values we proceed as follows: recall that equation (21) implicitly determines the search cutoff
value. Given a parameterization of the search cost distribution, this search cost cutoff value maps
to the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of searchers in each different submarket.
As discussed above, our empirical results imply that variation in predicted search probabilities
results from variation in UIB and not from variation in past wages. This is why we choose to
have as our benchmark calibration the same wage across submarkets, that differ in terms of UIB
amounts. This leads, as in our empirical analysis, to a situation where search probabilities vary
solely because of variation in replacement rates.
We thus choose as our calibration targets the estimates reported in Table 3, again noting that
the variation in predicted search probabilities emerges from variation in the UIB, and not past
wages. We then proceed as follows. We employ a non-linear search algorithm over the parameter
space of µs and σs, calculating for each pair the vector of model-implied CDFs across the different
submarkets. The resulting vector is compared with the underlying empirical search probabilities
reported in Table 3. We pick the pair that minimizes the sum of deviations between the model-
implied CDFs and the estimated search probabilities.
Tax rate For the benchmark economy, and for each of the reforms, we calculate the tax rate
resulting in government revenues equaling government expenses on unemployment benefits.
6. Policy Experiments
In this section we use the quantitative model to examine a number of issues about which our
identified moments cannot provide a definite answer: (i) quantification of the equilibrium effects
of changes in benefit generosity across the distribution of replacement rates; (ii) study how the
magnitude of these effects depends on the degree of wage flexibility; (iii) evaluation of the extent
of non-linearities in the transmission mechanism of benefit changes to the mass of searchers, job-
finding rates conditional on searching, and employment rates.
In addition, it is also of interest to assess if and extent to which the effect of a change in benefit
generosity is non-monotonic in its size, an issue that our local empirical analysis cannot address. In
fact, general equilibrium forces can in principle cause the mass of searchers to decline in response
to increases in benefit generosity, even if the underlying estimated elasticity is positive. This can
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arise in instances where reforms in UI benefits are so large that they lead to major reductions in
the job-finding rate conditional on searching, making it less attractive to engage in search. For
example, consider the extreme case where UIB are so high that the “search-and-matching” market
shuts down, i.e., there is no equilibrium with vacancy posting. In such a case, although the UIB
are higher, the search probability will collapse to zero. Such general-equilibrium considerations
cannot be captured by the reduced-form estimates in our empirical analysis.
Given the presence of a distribution of replacement rates, we model UI reforms as policies that
multiply the vector of replacement rates~b by a constant factor. Thus, for example, for a reform that
prescribes an across-the-board 10% increase in replacement rates, the post-reform replacements
rates are equal to the pre-reform rates times the factor 1.1. Overall, we consider reforms ranging
from a factor of 1.1. to 1.3, i.e., from 10% to 30% across-the-board increases in replacement rates.
6.1. Mass of Searchers
Figures 2a-2c depict the resulting equilibrium mass of searchers for (i) the three different wage
mechanisms discussed above, and (ii) different magnitudes of policy reforms. In these figures, as
well as in the remaining ones in this section, the x-axis reports the pre-reform replacement rates.
On the y-axis, we report the different UI policy factors that multiply the pre-reform replacement
rates. The curve at the lower edge of the graph, corresponding to where the UI policy factor equals
one, shows the mass of searchers in the benchmark economy prior to the reforms. Note that the
benchmark mass of searchers is the result of our matching moment exercise, and hence it is the
same in each of the three panels (one for each wage mechanism).
Consider first the case of Nash bargaining in Figure 2a. In this case, for reforms that are not "too
big," we find that the mass of searchers increases for all values of pre-reform replacement rates.
However, once reforms imply values of replacement rates roughly above 70%, they can lead in fact
to a reduction in the mass of searchers. To understand the forces at work, one need to consider
the impact of the UIB policy change on the job-finding rates conditional on searching, as depicted
in Figures 3a-3c. Under the Nash-bargaining scenario, "big reforms" that push replacement rates
to very high levels, significantly lower the job-finding rate (conditional on searching), such that
the overall return to engage in active search declines. This happens, because, as is common for
the Nash-bargaining wage protocol, the equilibrium wage increases in response to the increase in
benefits, as depicted in Figure 4a. Such drops in the job-finding rate negatively affect the return
to searching, which results in a smaller mass of unemployed individuals engaging in actual job
27





In the case of sticky wages, instead, reforms that increase replacement rates across the board,
leave wages unchanged by construction. By the free-entry condition for job vacancy posting, this
implies that job-finding rates conditional on searching are unaffected by the reforms, too. As
such, the sole effect of higher benefits is to provide "liquidity" for the unemployed to afford the
monetary search cost. This, unambiguously, explains why higher benefits lead to a greater search
likelihood for all values of pre-reform replacement rates, as depicted in Figure 2c.
The case of the semi-flexible wages, which was restricted to match the reported elasticity of the
job-finding rate to benefits as in Chetty (2008), naturally lies in between the two extremes of Nash-
bargaining and sticky wages. In a nutshell, this model exhibits an increase in the search likelihood
for almost all values of replacement rates, besides, again, those that cross a threshold of about
70%. Under semi-flexible wages, the job-finding rate conditional on searching does not exhibit the
precipitous fall that it has under Nash-bargaining. Dampening the decline in the job-finding rate
increases the relative return to engage in active search.
To sum, an important lesson from the GE model is that UI policy reforms can in fact reduce
the mass of searchers if they result in increasing replacement rates above a certain threshold. For
relatively modest reforms, benefit changes lead to an increase in the mass of active searchers in the
economy. For example, for the semi-flexible wage case, we find that the average benefit recipient
would increase her search likelihood by 1 percentage point, in the case of the smallest benefit
reform, and 4.3 percentage points in the case of the biggest benefit reform we consider. Yet, such
big reforms would lead those who would be entitled to very high replacement rates to exhibit a fall
in their search likelihood; for example, for the same semi-flexible wage case we find the highest
benefit recipient would exhibit a fall of about 0.5 percentage points in her search likelihood.
6.2. Employment Rate






where Ω(b) is the fraction of individuals engaged in active search, p(b) is the likelihood of finding
a job conditional on searching, δ is the exit rate from employment, or job-destruction rate, and U
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Hence, given our empirical finding that Ω′(b)b∗/Ω(b) > 0, the disincentive effect of UIB on the
employment rate, p′(b)b∗/p(b) < 0, is mitigated. Ceteris paribus, any increase in the mass of
searchers leads to a corresponding uptick in the employment rate, which counteracts the disin-
centive effect of UI benefits conditional on searching.
Figures 5a-5c depict the employment rate for the different UIB policy changes: as before the
curve at the lower edge of the graph, corresponding to where the UIB policy axis equals one, is
identical in each of the three panels and illustrates the employment rate in the benchmark econ-
omy prior to any policy reform. First, naturally, for the sticky-wage equilibrium, the employment
rate rises for all reforms and for all values of the pre-reform replacement rates; again, this stems
from the fact that the job-finding rate conditional on searching does not change (Figure 3c), while
the fraction of searchers increases (Figure 2c). However, as Figures 5a-5b show, in the Nash-
bargaining and semi-flexible wage case, the employment rate always falls, more so as the reforms
become more generous. This stems from the job-finding rate unambiguously falling.
What is the quantitative contribution of an active search on the employment rate? To gauge the
effect, we compare the employment rate change implied by the reforms in the baseline economy
with search with a counterfactual economy without an active search margin, in which all adjust-
ment comes form changes in the job-finding rate. Figure 6 compares the change in the employment
rate relative to its value prior to any reform for the three different wage settings and reform sizes.
Consider the semi-flexible wage economy, which is depicted in the second row of Figure 6. In this
case, for almost all scenarios the employment rate falls by less in our baseline economy than in the
counterfactual economy without a search margin. This is because the search likelihood increases
in the baseline economy which counteracts the fall in the job-finding rate conditional on search.
34Consistent with our data, we classify as unemployed those individuals who do not engage in active search but
receive benefits. As shown in Table 1, in our data, a nontrivial share of unemployed individuals does not meet the
requirement of active search.
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6.3. Unconditional Job-Finding Rate
What is the resulting effect on the unconditional job-finding rate? In our model, this is the product
of the mass of searchers and the job-finding rate conditional on search:
P = Ω(b)p(b), (28)










Estimating the elasticity of the job-finding rate with respect to benefits is the focus of many papers
in the literature, which typically finds a negative elasticity, i.e. k< 0.35
The expression in (29) shows that the generalized elasticity includes two different elasticities:
(i) the elasticity of the likelihood of job search, Ω′(b∗)b∗/Ω(b∗); and (ii) the elasticity of the job-
finding probability conditional on engaging in active search, p′(b∗)b∗/p(b∗). Thus, the effects of
changes in UIB on the job-finding rate, P, operate through two channels. To begin, everything
else equal, more generous UIB can induce more individuals to engage in search, as implied by our
empirical estimates of Ω′(b∗)b∗/Ω(b∗)> 0. In the context of our model we refer to this channel as
the “liquidity effect” of UI, in reference to the fact that more generous benefits allow individuals to
afford the monetary search cost. Previous literature has abstracted from this elasticity, since direct
information on active search has been generally of poor quality or missing altogether. The second
margin, which we refer to as the “disincentive effect” of UIB.36 This is the channel whereby an
increase in UIB generosity may induce the exit rate from unemployment to fall given the fact that
p(b) is decreasing in b.37
35The literature that studies the effects of UIB on labor market outcomes is extensive. It can be largely divided into
two groups. The first uses detailed micro data to study the extent to which the generosity of UIB affects unemployment
duration at the level of individuals. While the exact magnitudes of the effects vary by study, a consensus view has
emerged that: a higher replacement rate increases unemployment duration (see, e.g., Carling, Holmlund and Vejsiu
(2001), Røed and Zhang (2002), Lalive, Van Ours and Zweimüller (2006)) and that the exit rate from unemployment
spikes at the time benefits expire (see, e.g., Moffitt and Nicholson (1982), Moffitt (1985), Grossman (1989), Katz and
Meyer (1990a,b), Meyer (1990), Card and Levine (2000), Lalive and Zweimüller (2004), Lalive, Van Ours and Zweimüller
(2006), Landais (2015), Schmieder, Von Wachter and Bender (2012), and Johnston and Mas (2018)). These findings have
typically been interpreted as evidence of the disincentive effect of UI (see, e.g., Krueger and Meyer (2002), for a survey
article, and Feldstein (2005)).
36The literature also uses the term “moral hazard” in reference to the adverse incentive effect of UI both on individual
search and on job acceptance decisions.
37What are the implications of our local empirical finding that Ω′(b∗)b∗/Ω(b∗) > 0 for the measurement of the
disincentive effect of UIB? It follows that the disincentive effect of UIB estimated in the literature is, in fact, a lower
35
As discussed above, our empirical result cannot be used, by itself, for policy analysis. As such,
Figures 7a-7c depict the implications of the reforms for the unconditional job finding rate, which
is the product of the measure of searchers, depicted in Figures 2a-2c, and the job-finding rate
conditional on search, depicted in Figures 3a-3c. Perhaps not surprisingly, Figures 7a-7c show
the full extent of the non-linearities embodied in the model. For the cases where the measure of
searchers increases, this act to mitigate the fall in the unconditional job-finding rate. However,
once the economy enters into the region in which the search likelihood falls, the unconditional
job-finding rate takes a nose dive.
6.4. Discussion
Several important insights emerge from the policy experiments. First, UI benefit reforms imple-
mented under sticky wages have no effect on wages or job-finding rates. The only GE equilibrium
channel at work in this version of the model is the required change in the tax rate to balance
government expenditures on benefits. Overall, for the type of reforms considered, the liquidity
provided through more generous benefits increases the mass of searchers.
Second, the picture changes in the case of Nash-bargained or semi-flexible wages, which are
in-between the Nash and sticky-wage economies. Two opposing effects battle. On the one hand,
the partial-equilibrium liquidity effect that more generous benefits induce an increase in the mass
of searchers. On the other hand, increased benefits strengthen the bargaining position of unem-
ployed individuals, leading to lower job-finding rates, conditional on searching. As the analysis
above suggests, with respect to the mass of searchers, the liquidity effect dominates over the re-
duction in job-finding rates for "modest reforms," i.e., for reforms whose implied replacement rates
remain below 70%. Below that threshold, though the mass of searchers increases, the employment
rate falls, albeit by less than it would have fallen without the increase in the fraction of individu-
als searching in the economy. Yet, for more "extreme reforms," that raise replacement rates above
that threshold, the disincentive effect of increased benefits on the job-finding rate overpowers the
enhanced benefits from liquidity. These reforms result in a decline in the search probability and in
the employment rate, leading the exit rate from unemployment to exhibit a steep fall.
Third, we note the importance of considering the fiscal side of these reforms for the evaluation
of the impact they have on the economy. Recall that as part of our general-equilibrium analysis we




Ω(b∗) . Our estimate of the
search elasticity Ω′(b∗)b∗/Ω(b∗) of about 0.09 implies that researchers can pick their favorite value of k and recover a
new, lower (i.e., more negative) value for the disincentive effect of UIB.
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look for the tax rate needed to fund the additional government expenses on UI benefits implied
by the reforms. In our economy, the tax rate always increases with the generosity of benefits
which reduces work incentives. Appendix C formally shows this by comparing the response
of the different variables of interest in our economies vis-à-vis economies where the tax rate is
not changed (and thus the government budget constraint is not cleared). Naturally, absent the
required hike in the tax rate, all UI reforms end up with more "favorable" labor-market outcomes.
Figure 8 summarizes the tradeoffs between the increase in the mass of searchers and the fall in
the exit rate from unemployment across the different wage settings and for individuals located at
different points of the pre-reform distribution of replacement rate. For concreteness, consider the
middle row of the semi-flexible wage economy and the first column which corresponds to indi-
viduals with the lowest pre-reform replacement rate. As the figure shows, the tradeoff between
a fall in the exit rate and the increase in the measure of searchers is visible. As the size of the
reform increases (moving northwest), the exit rate declines further and further while the measure
of searchers increases. For these individuals, the reform does not result in replacement rates that
cross the threshold above which the measure of searchers starts to fall. In contrast, consider the last
column which corresponds to individuals with the maximum pre-reform replacement rate. For
this group of individuals, there are reforms for which both the exit rate and the mass of searchers
fall. Note, for sake of comparison, that in the Nash-bargaining scenario (first row of Figure 8), for
the same individuals, the fall in the mass of searchers occurs for even smaller reforms. Hence, an
important message is that the effects of changes in UIB on job search are generally non-monotonic,
such that the sign of the comparative statics with respect to the measure of searchers may even
flip depending on the magnitude of the change in UIB prescribed by the reform.
Figure 8 highlights the tradeoffs faced by a policymaker. UI benefit reforms can in fact lead
to an increase in the measure of unemployed engaged in active search. Such an increase would
counteract the usual disincentive effect of increased benefits on the exit rate from unemployment.
However, large increases in UIB generosity could in fact be counterproductive as they would re-
sult in a drop in the measure of searchers on top of the usual disincentive effect of benefit increases.
Hence, one important implication of the model is that the estimated effects in our empirical anal-
ysis are not necessarily informative about the effects of large reforms, which naturally set general
equilibrium forces in motion. A policymaker considering solely our empirical estimates would
fail to recognize the detrimental effect of large changes in the generosity of the unemployment
insurance system.
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Overall, our policy analysis findings relate to the recent important research that focuses on the
equilibrium response of wages, job creation, and labor market tightness. This literature highlights
the general-equilibrium effects of UIB. Perhaps not surprisingly given the challenge task of iden-
tifying these effects, different researchers have arrived at different results. Hagedorn et al. (2013)
estimate a large and positive macro elasticity of unemployment with respect to a change in UIB
generosity in the United States. They do so by comparing counties that border states with differ-
ent potential benefit durations, finding that benefit extensions raise equilibrium wages and lead
to a sharp reduction in vacancy posting and employment. Moreover, Hagedorn, Manovskii and
Mitman (2015) study what happens when benefit extensions are eliminated nationwide, which
occurred in the U.S. in December of 2013 after the U.S. congress failed to reauthorize the benefit
extensions introduced during the Great Recession. They find that reducing the benefit duration
boosted aggregate employment considerably. Consistent with these results, Johnston and Mas
(2018) look at the unexpected cut in potential benefit duration that took place in Missouri in April
2011. They discover a significant positive effect on job creation. In contrast, Chodorow-Reich,
Coglianese and Karabarbounis (2018) exploit cross-state variation in UIB extensions caused by
measurement error in within-state unemployment rates. These errors stem from data revisions
to the actual measured unemployment rate and imply that two states with the same revised un-
employment rate may end up having different benefit durations solely because their real-time
measured unemployment rates differed. This approach identified a small or even negative effect
of benefit extensions on unemployment. Similarly, Boone et al. (2016) find no evidence that UI
benefit extensions during the Great Recessions substantially affected county-level employment.38
38See Dieterle, Bartalotti and Brummet (2020) for recent work casting doubts on the research design that uses cross-



































































































































































































































































We use a unique and rich dataset that enables us to estimate the effect of unemployment insurance
generosity on the likelihood of an unemployed individual engaging in active job search. Our
identification leverages plausible exogenous variation in benefits due to the fact that in most U.S.
states benefit amounts are determined based on the earnings in the best quarter of the previous
year. Controlling for past wages, standard demographic characteristics, as well as the industry
and occupation of the individual before the unemployment spell, our estimates suggest a positive
and statistically significant effect of UIB on the likelihood of job search for most deciles of the past
wages distribution.
To rationalize these findings, we provide a simple non-parametric theoretical framework that
points to a monetary cost of job search as a key driver of our results. We build on this insight and
develop a quantitative search-and-matching, heterogeneous-agent, general equilibrium model
with costly search. We then use the model as a laboratory to evaluate the effects of different
changes in the unemployment insurance system.
In the model, there is a trade-off that is relevant for the evaluation of policy reforms. Every-
thing else equal, more generous benefits induce more unemployment individuals to search. This
is the "liquidity effect" of UIB in that it allows individuals to afford the monetary cost of search.
However, by improving the bargaining position of the unemployed, higher benefits lead to higher
wages, which in turn depresses vacancy posting and thereby the probability of finding a job con-
ditional on searching. We refer to this as "disincentive effect" of UIB in that by adversely affecting
the job finding probability, it can dissuade individuals from actually engaging in job search, im-
plying the possibility of non-monotonic effects of benefit changes on the fraction of unemployed
individuals actively looking for employment.
Notably, for small reforms, the positive response of the search margin mitigates the negative
disincentive effect on the employment rate. For large reforms, instead, the disincentive effect
can be strong enough so that the reduction in the fraction of individuals searching magnifies the
negative effects on the employment rate. Overall our results suggest that the policy maker faces a
tradeoff that has not been discussed before when considering unemployment insurance reforms –
that between the increase in the measure of unemployed engaged in active search which comes at
the cost of a fall in the exit rate from unemployment.
Altogether, the results in this paper highlight the importance of direct measurement of mone-
41
tary search costs, information about which is almost non-existent. Concretely, standard surveys of
the labor market could add questions aimed at gauging the extent, as well as the type, of real costs
incurred by job seekers. Our empirical and theoretical results suggest that measuring these costs
is essential to bringing about any well-designed reform of the unemployment insurance system.
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A. Appendix: Data Source and Variables’ Construction
A.1. Dataset
Dataset construction The underlying row data has 635,940 observations covering the years 1989-
2006. We remove 171,500 observations of individuals who for different reasons are not required
to engage in search and are left with 438,980 observations. We then remove observations that
belong to states that do not use the HQ system and lose 257,253 observations and are left with
181,727 observations. We remove 21,382 observations for which we have missing information
(such as information about occupations and industries worked, HQ, education, maximum benefit
amount in the state year, recall status, weeks left, age, race) and are left with 160,345 individuals.
In order to be able to estimate the effects of UIB on the likelihood of search we need to have a
minimal number of non-searchers since in their absence it would create difficulties for inference
due to very small probability events. As such, we only use states which use the HQ system and
have more than 600 observations of individuals who were required to search in order to be eli-
gible for UIB but who did not engage in active search. This restriction leaves us with a sample
size of 65,556 observations. Our HQ states include Arizona, Indiana, Minnesota, North Carolina,
Nevada, Virginia, and Washington.39 We also experiment with less stringent minimum number of
non-searchers per state which increases our sample size and find our results to be generally robust
to these alternative specifications.
BPW and HQ Because BPW in the data are censored at $100,000, our analysis centers on the
subpopulation of individuals whose BPW is below this threshold. As we discuss in the text, we
carry out the analysis for subpopulations defined by the deciles of the BPW distribution and place
no restrictions across these quantiles as to the impact of UIB, BPW, and other covariates on job
search. Thus, our results are unaffected by the choice to focus on individuals earning at most
$100,000 in the base period, but pertain only to this subpopulation. With respect to the HQ variable
we note that our data only includes information regarding the single highest quarter during the
year prior to the unemployment spell.
Search Each payment error in the BAM data is assigned a code. Our search variable is based on
a lack of eligibility error due to active work search.
Two digit occupations & SOC codes 11 Management Occupations, 13 Business and Financial
Operations Occupations,15 Computer and Mathematical Occupations, 17 Architecture and Engi-
neering Occupations, 19 Life, Physical, and Social Science Occupations, 21 Community and Social
39For Washington we exclude the year 2005 since in that year Washington did not have the HQ system.
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Services Occupations, 23 Legal Occupations, 25 Education, Training, and Library Occupations,
27 Arts, Design, Entertainment, Sports, and Media Occupations, 29 Healthcare Practitioners and
Technical Occupations, 31 Healthcare Support Occupations, 33 Protective Service Occupations,
35 Food Preparation and Serving Related Occupations, 37 Building and Grounds Cleaning and
Maintenance Occupations, 39 Personal Care and Service Occupations, 41 Sales and Related Occu-
pations, 43 Office and Administrative Support Occupations, 45 Farming, Fishing, and Forestry Oc-
cupations, 47 Construction and Extraction Occupations, 49 Installation, Maintenance, and Repair
Occupations, 51 Production Occupations, 53 Transportation and Material Moving Occupations,
55 Military Specific Occupations.
Two digit industries & SOC codes 11 Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing, Hunting, 21 Mining, 22
Utilities, 23 Construction, 31-33 Manufacturing, 42 Wholesale Trade, 44-45 Retail Trade, 48-49
Transportation and Warehousing, 51 Information, 52 Finance and Insurance, 53 Real Estate, Rental
and Leasing, 54 Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services, 55 Management of Companies
and Enterprises, 56 Administrative Support, Waste Management and Remediation Services, 61
Education Services, 62 Health Care and Social Assistance, 71 Arts, Entertainment and Recreation,











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure A1: Distribution of Weeks Left


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































B. Appendix: Regression Kink Design
In several cases, the study of UIB relies on the use of the regression kink design (RKD) (see,
e.g., Card et al. (2015), Card et al. (2015), Landais (2015)). The intuition behind this approach
rests on the formulaic relationship between UIB and HQ, according to which UIB ≡ f (HQ) =
bmin(HQ, M), with b the replacement rate and bM the maximum level of UIB allowed for in a
given state and year. Assuming that benefit recipients are not able to precisely manipulate their
HQ to systematically place themselves below (or above) the cutoff bM, and that recipients near
























Intuitively, if UIB has a causal effect on search, given the kink in the deterministic relationship
between HQ and UIB, there should be a kink in the relationship between search and HQ at M.
One can therefore use data local to the kink to learn the effect of UIB on search for people whose
HQ are close to the threshold bM. In practice, the effect is estimated through a local polynomial
regression that uses data around the kink.
We implement our RKD analysis first graphically, using the Stata package Calonico, Cattaneo
and Titiunik (2014a), which implements the methods put forward by Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiu-
nik (2014b). We use Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014a) default choices of tuning parameters.
In Figure B1 we show that in our data there is graphical evidence for a kinked relationship be-
tween search and HQ at M: as the figure shows, to the left of the kink the probability of search
grows rapidly with HQ, while to the right of the kink it is much flatter.40
Using Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014a) Stata package, we determine the bandwidth to be
used in estimating the effect of interest (which equals 0.209 in our data). We then estimate the effect
of UIB on search using a specification similar to Massenkoff (2020). Because benefit schedules
vary across states and years, we include in the RKD specification cell fixed effects (denoted by αz,t
where z is the state and t is the year) for each unique combination of state, replacement rate, and
benefit maximum. To allow for the possibility that not all claimants may receive the exact benefit
predicted by their schedule, we use the fuzzy RKD method (Card et al., 2015, Section 2.2.2). We
implement the method through two stage least squares for the subsample with |HQ−M|< 0.209,
40The binned data show a similar pattern.
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Sample average within bin Polynomial fit of order 4
Regression function fit
Notes: Data normalized so that M = 0.
where the first and second stage specifications are, respectively,




[νp(HQi,z,t −M)p + ηp1(HQi,z,t > M)(HQi,z,t −M)p] + ri,z,t,
(B2)




δp(HQi,z,t −M)p + εi,z,t. (B3)
The results for the case p̄ = 1 are in Table B1. While the effect of UIB on search is positive, it is very
imprecisely estimated: the confidence intervals are wide and cover zero.41
Our RKD results here are related to the recent work of Massenkoff (2020) who uses a RKD ap-
proach and data from the BAM, to study the effect of UIB on different variables than ours: the
unemployment duration, the log reservation wage, the reservation ratio, an indicator for switch-
ing occupations, and the number of contacts for the benefits recipient. In each case, similar to our
RKD results, Massenkoff (2020) RKD results suggest no obvious response to UIB.
Overall, the imprecision in our RKD estimates is unsurprising, due to the slow rate of conver-
gence of nonparametric estimators of derivatives (see, e.g. Li and Racine, 2007). Indeed, Card et al.
(2015) obtain results on the effect of unemployment benefits on unemployment duration in Aus-
41As expected, this is not ameliorated by increasing the value of p̄: the confidence intervals get wider and the sign
of UIB becomes negative.
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Table B1: Fuzzy RKD Estimates
First Stage
Variable Estimate Std. Err. t-stat 95% Confidence Interval
1(HQ > M) 0.001474 0.0004125 3.57 (0.0006655, 0.0022825)
HQ−M 0.1545972 0.0023233 66.54 (0.1500433, 0.1591511)
1(HQ > M)(HQ−M) -0.1424429 0.0035186 -40.48 (-0.1493397, -0.1355461)
Second Stage
Variable Estimate Std. Err. t-stat 95% Confidence Interval
UIB 0.3159402 0.5617932 0.56 (-0.7852247, 1.417105)
1(HQ > M) -0.0029539 0.0093536 -0.32 (-0.0212878, 0.01538)
HQ−M 0.0969831 0.0655485 1.48 (-0.0314978, 0.225464)
tria that are indicative of a positive elasticity, but that are imprecisely estimated with confidence
intervals that cover zero when using RKD methods.
Finally, we note again that in our main empirical analysis in Section 2 we use plausibly exoge-
nous variation in UIB. Unlike the RKD approach that uses solely local to the kink observations,
our approach in Section 2 leverages the entirety of the wage distribution.
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C. Appendix: UI Reforms Without Clearing the Government Budget
Constraint
Figure C1: Relation between UI Benefits and Fraction of Searchers
(a) Nash Wages: Govt. Clearing (b) Nash Wages: Constant Tax Rate
(c) Semi-Flexible Wages: Govt. Clearing (d) Semi-Flexible Wages: Constant Tax Rate
(e) Sticky Wages: Govt. Clearing (f) Sticky Wages: Constant Tax Rate
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Figure C2: Relation between UI Benefits and Job-Finding Probability
(a) Nash Wages: Govt. Clearing (b) Nash Wages: Constant Tax Rate
(c) Semi-Flexible Wages: Govt. Clearing (d) Semi-Flexible Wages: Constant Tax Rate
(e) Sticky Wages: Govt. Clearing (f) Sticky Wages: Constant Tax Rate
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Figure C3: Relation between UI Benefits and Job-Finding Probability (Conditional on Searching)
(a) Nash Wages: Govt. Clearing (b) Nash Wages: Constant Tax Rate
(c) Semi-Flexible Wages: Govt. Clearing (d) Semi-Flexible Wages: Constant Tax Rate
(e) Sticky Wages: Govt. Clearing (f) Sticky Wages: Constant Tax Rate
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Figure C4: Relation between UI Benefits and Employment Rate
(a) Nash Wages: Govt. Clearing (b) Nash Wages: Constant Tax Rate
(c) Semi-Flexible Wages: Govt. Clearing (d) Semi-Flexible Wages: Constant Tax Rate
(e) Sticky Wages: Govt. Clearing (f) Sticky Wages: Constant Tax Rate
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Figure C5: Relation between UI Benefits and Wages
(a) Nash Wages: Govt. Clearing (b) Nash Wages: Constant Tax Rate
(c) Semi-Flexible Wages: Govt. Clearing (d) Semi-Flexible Wages: Constant Tax Rate
(e) Sticky Wages: Govt. Clearing (f) Sticky Wages: Constant Tax Rate
D. Appendix: Model with One Value of the Bargaining Weight
The figures in this appendix show the results for our benchmark economy when the bargaining
weight parameter ρ is calibrated to be identical across all values of the replacement rate vector~b.
In the benchmark model, to generate the same value of the job-finding rate across the different
values of~b, our calibration yields values of ρ that are decreasing in b. Since in this version of the
model ρ is the same, then under the Nash-bargaining wage scenario, the sensitivity of the job-
finding rate to a change in the UIB is higher, resulting in a bigger fall in the job-finding rate and
the employment rate. As in our main model, the "semi-flexible" wages case lies in between the
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Nash bargaining model and the sticky wages model. Overall, the results of this specification are
similar to our main specification.
Figure D1: Relation between UI Benefits and Fraction of Searchers
(a) Nash Wages: Benchmark Economy (b) Nash Wages: Alternative Bargaining
(c) Semi-Flexible Wages: Benchmark Economy (d) Semi-Flexible Wages: Alternative Bargaining
(e) Sticky Wages: Benchmark Economy (f) Sticky Wages: Alternative Bargaining
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Figure D2: Relation between UI Benefits and Job-Finding Probability
(a) Nash Wages: Benchmark Economy (b) Nash Wages: Alternative Bargaining
(c) Semi-Flexible Wages: Benchmark Economy (d) Semi-Flexible Wages: Alternative Bargaining
(e) Sticky Wages: Benchmark Economy (f) Sticky Wages: Alternative Bargaining
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Figure D3: Relation between UI Benefits and Job-Finding Probability (Conditional on Searching)
(a) Nash Wages: Benchmark Economy (b) Nash Wages: Alternative Bargaining
(c) Semi-Flexible Wages: Benchmark Economy (d) Semi-Flexible Wages: Alternative Bargaining
(e) Sticky Wages: Benchmark Economy (f) Sticky Wages: Alternative Bargaining
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Figure D4: Relation between UI Benefits and Employment Rate
(a) Nash Wages: Benchmark Economy (b) Nash Wages: Alternative Bargaining
(c) Semi-Flexible Wages: Benchmark Economy (d) Semi-Flexible Wages: Alternative Bargaining
(e) Sticky Wages: Benchmark Economy (f) Sticky Wages: Alternative Bargaining
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Figure D5: Relation between UI Benefits and Wages
(a) Nash Wages: Benchmark Economy (b) Nash Wages: Alternative Bargaining
(c) Semi-Flexible Wages: Benchmark Economy (d) Semi-Flexible Wages: Alternative Bargaining
(e) Sticky Wages: Benchmark Economy (f) Sticky Wages: Alternative Bargaining
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E. Appendix: Model with Contractible Search Costs
In this appendix, we present an alternative model economy where, in contrast to the benchmark
model, search costs are contractible. In this variant of the model, wages vary among individuals
based on their replacement rates as well as the monetary search cost they incur. Preferences, bud-
get constraints, production, and meeting technologies are the same as in the benchmark model.
E.1. Environment
Heterogeneity Individuals are heterogeneous along two dimensions. First, they differ in terms
of their cost of searching. Specifically, the monetary cost of search s ≥ 0 is i.i.d. and drawn from a
Log-Normal distribution with mean µs and variance σ2s . Once the individual gets her initial draw,
the value of s stays the same forever. Second, as in the benchmark model, individuals differ in
terms of their replacement rates, b ∈ [bmin,bmax], defined as the ratio of UIB to wages.
Market structure To keep things simple, we assume that labor markets are segmented by re-
placement rates b and the search cost s. Firms post vacancies in the submarket with the highest
expected payoff, knowing with certainty the value of the replacement rate b that the unemployed
carry in that submarket, as well as the search cost s that the unemployed would incur if she chooses
to search. The mass of firms in each submarket is determined in free-entry equilibrium, indepen-
dently of other submarkets.
The labor market is organized in a continuum of submarkets indexed by the couple (b, s). In
each submarket, matching is subject to a search friction. The ratio of vacancies to searchers θ(b, s)
denotes tightness of submarket (b, s). We denote the probability that an individual meets a va-
cancy by p(θ(b, s)), where p : R+→[0,1] is a strictly increasing function with p(0) = 0. And the
rate at which a vacancy meets a searcher by q(θ(b, s)) = p(θ(b, s))/θ(b, s).
E.2. Value Functions
Individual’s problem In each submarket (b, s), individuals can be in three different labor-market
states: (i) employed (e), (ii) unemployed and searching (u), (iii) unemployed and not-searching (n).
The value of being employed Ve in submarket (b, s) is
Ve(b, s) = u(ce) + β [δmax{Vu(b, s),Vn(b, s)}+ (1− δ)Ve(b, s)] , (E1)
where ce = (1− τ)w(b, s) is consumption if employed and w(b, s) is the wage rate whose determi-
nation we describe below. The parameter δ ∈ [0,1] is an exogenous and constant job destruction
rate, which is the same in all submarkets.
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The value of being unemployed and searching, Vu, and the value of being unemployed and
not-searching, Vn, in submarket (b, s) are, respectively,
Vu(b, s) = u(cu) + β{p(θ(b, s))Ve(b, s) + [1− p(θ(b, s))]max{Vu(b, s),Vn(b, s)}} , (E2)
Vn(b, s) = u(cn) + βVn(b, s), (E3)
where cu = bw(b, s)− s and cn = bw(b, s) are consumption if searching and not-searching, respec-
tively.
Firm’s problem Vacancies can be either filled, so that a job is created, or unfilled. The value of a
job J in submarket (b, s) is
J(b, s) = ε− w(b, s) + β [δV + (1− δ)J(b, s)] , (E4)
where ε is the output of a match, which is the same in all submarkets, and V is the value of posting
a vacancy.
In an equilibrium with free entry, the value of an unfilled vacancy is zero at all times, and in all




= βJ(b, s), (E5)
where k ≥ 0 is the unit cost of posting and maintaining a vacancy.
E.3. Nash Bargaining
When a searcher and a firm meet, they enter into bilateral Nash-bargaining. Search costs are
contractible. Here, in contrast to the benchmark model, the worker’s forgone value of accepting
a job offer is Vu(b, s), which depends on the search cost s through consumption cu = bw(b, s)− s.
As standard, we assume that bargaining resumes every period and that the wage is determined
according to
wNash(b, s) = argmax [Ve(b, s)−Vu(b, s)]ρ J(b, s)1−ρ, (E6)
where ρ ∈ [0,1] is a parameter capturing the individuals’ bargaining weight.
The solution to the Nash-bargaining problem yields a modified sharing rule,
(1− τ)ρuc(ce)J(b, s) = (1− ρ) [Ve(b, s)−Vu(b, s)] , (E7)
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which implies that the wage is generally a function of the replacement rate b, and of the search
cost s. We expand more on this below.
E.4. Equilibrium
As in the standard DMP model, as well as in our benchmark model, the equilibrium is block-
recursive. That is, we can solve for the wages and tightness ratios independently of the stocks
of employment, unemployment, and the mass of searchers. Equipped with wages and tightness
ratios, we can then calculate search cutoffs s∗(b) and so the mass of searchers G(s∗(b)) in each
submarket.
Market tightness and wages In each submarket, the free-entry condition (E5) determines the




β [ε− w(b, s)]
1− β (1− δ) . (E8)





(1− ρ) [u (ce)− u (cu)]
1− β [1− δ− p(θ(b, s))] , (E9)
where ce = (1− τ)w(b, s), cu = bw(b, s)− s, and τ is here the tax rate that balances the government
budget.
Linear utility case To provide some intuition, it is useful to consider the case in which the utility
function is linear in consumption, such that u(c) = c and uc(c) = 1. In the linear utility case, and




(1− ρ) [(1− b)w(b, s) + s]
1− β [1− δ− p(θ(b, s))] . (E10)
First, equation (E8) gives a downward-sloping quasi-labor demand curve. The higher the wage,
the higher the job-filling probability, which implies a lower tightness ratio. Second, equation (E10)
gives an upward-sloping quasi-labor supply curve. The higher the wage, the higher the tightness
ratio. Intuitively, a higher tightness ratio implies a lower expected unemployment duration, which
strengthens the bargaining position of the unemployed at the expense of the firm. The intersection
of these two curves gives the equilibrium wage and tightness ratio in each submarket.
The comparative statics with respect to the replacement rate is unambiguous. As b does not en-
ter equation (E8), it necessarily affects the equilibrium solely through equation (E10). Everything
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else equal, a higher b induces a new equilibrium with a higher wage and a lower tightness ratio.
A higher replacement rate makes the individual’s bargaining position stronger leading to a higher
bargained wage and thereby diminished incentive to post vacancies.
Note also that the search cost s does not enter equation (E8), but it enters equation (E10) as
a left-ward shifter of the quasi-labor supply curve. Everything else equal, a higher value of the
search cost induces an equilibrium with a lower wage and a higher tightness ratio. The intuition
for this result is fairly simple. When the unemployed individual enters the bargaining with the
firm, the search cost is sunk. This weakens the bargaining position of the unemployed, giving
an advantage to the firm which lowers the wage. From the free-entry condition, a lower wage
mandates a higher tightness ratio, and so a higher probability to find a job.
Search cutoff In each submarket (b, s), the search decision satisfies a reservation policy rule such
that if Vu > Vn the individual searches, otherwise, if Vu ≤ Vn, he or she does not search. The
indifference condition Vu = Vn implies then a cutoff value s∗, such that is s < s∗ the individual
searches, whereas if s ≥ s∗ the individual does not search. Note that the cutoff value s∗ depends
on b. Notably, the higher b, the higher the cutoff s∗ that makes the individual indifferent between
searching and not searching. Formally, the search cutoff is implicitly determined by
(1− β(1− δ))u(cu) + βp(θ(b, s))u(ce)
1− β(1− δ) + βp(θ(b, s)) = u(cn). (E11)
In this model, one cannot formally show that there is a unique cutoff of search cost per value
of replacement ratio. However, quantitative evaluation of the model suggests that the mapping
between b and s is indeed unique and monotonically increasing, as in the benchmark model.42
42Results are available upon request from the authors.
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